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Abstract: This paper investigates the determinants of FDI sectoral allocation in 29 
China’s manufacturing sectors from 2000 to 2007. We find that FDI sectoral 
allocation has a strong self-reinforcing effect. MNCs with ownership advantages tend 
to invest more in local high productivity sectors. The FDI presence, however, is 
discouraged in China’s high productivity sectors in which the major market share is 
dominated by SOEs. We also find that the degree of FDI penetration is higher in 
sectors that are producing labor-intensive goods and also export-oriented.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Cross-border business activities of multinational enterprises (MNE) are one of the 
most salient features of the modern global economy. Many governments also see 
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) pivotal in their economic development 
strategy. In this paper we document econometrically the determinants of inward FDI 
sectoral location in China by means of dynamic panel regression analysis with a 
dataset of 29 manufacturing sectors over the years 2000-2007. The Chinese 
experience is valuable in the study of FDI location, partly because of the sheer 
magnitude and phenomenal growth of FDI the country has received since her reform 
in 1978, but more importantly because of the diversity and richness of the data. Due 
to the fast growth of the country and occurrence of major economic and political 
events that caused changes in FDI flows – both over time as well as across sectors – 
the Chinese case serves like a natural experiment that allows us to test various 
theories of FDI incidence. We believe the test results should not only be relevant to 
those who are interested in China’s development but also relevant for improving our 
understanding of FDI and MNE theory in general.    
 Figure 1 plots the foreign share of owner’s equities for each of the 29 
manufacturing sectors over the eight years from 2000 to 2007. It can be seen that the 
29 time series of FDI shares spread out from nearly zero to a maximum of about 0.7 
and there are also quite a number of crossovers among the series. Clearly the location 
of FDI in China is characterized by enormous sectoral as well as temporal diversity. 
Another eye-catching feature of Figure 1 is the persistence of the FDI shares over 
time, a pattern that reflects the self-reinforcing or agglomeration effect of FDI 
activities as emphasized by Head et al. (1995), Cheng and Kwan (2000), and 
Blonigen et al. (2005), among many others. A satisfactory empirical model ought to 
explain these salient features of FDI location in a consistent framework, and this 
motivates our adoption of the dynamic panel regression model as the econometric 
platform in this study.   
There has been a vast literature studying the incentives and determinants of FDI 
geographical location. These studies, though different in terms of theoretical 
framework, data source, and empirical methodology, tend to arrive at more or less 
consistent conclusions about certain aggregate variables such as quality of 
infrastructure and work force, market access, factor costs, and concessionary tax 
policy. There also exists a line of literature offering theoretical explanations, mostly 
from the industrial organization and trade theory perspective, for FDI allocation and 
MNE activities across different sectors. Nevertheless the theoretical suggestions from 
this literature very often conflict with each other and no single theory seems to be able 
to provide the complete answer (Cave 1974; Faeth 2009). Therefore, an empirical 
testing of the predictions by various analytical schools, which is what we are going to 
do in this paper, should be a useful complement to the theoretical literature. 
Early empirical research on FDI sectoral allocation tends to focus on the role of 
specific factors in determining FDI presence.
1
 Research going beyond one analytical 
school that compares several determinants of FDI sectoral allocation has become 
                                                     
1
 For instance, Horst (1972) shows that Canadian MNEs in US tend to invest in R&D intensive industries and 
scale economies is a prior condition for FDI to penetrate local industry. Buckley and Casson (1976) also document 
that a higher degree of MNE internalization is observed in R&D intensive industries. Swedenborg (1979) reports 
that industries with scale economies and more capital intensive are more attractive to Swedish outward FDI. 
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more popular after the late 1970s.
2
 Though most of these studies examine FDI in a 
comparative statics setting, recent empirical research shows that it may be more 
reasonable to describe FDI activities in a dynamic framework. For instance, Wheeler 
and Mody (1992) document that manufacturing and electronics FDI are positively 
correlated to agglomeration benefit indices that capture infrastructure quality, degree 
of industrialization and level of FDI penetration. Head et al. (1995) and Blonigen et 
al. (2005) show that Japanese firms’ location decisions are affected by the 
participation of other Japanese MNCs in either vertical or horizontal keiretsu. Cheng 
and Kwan (2000a, b) provide evidence for the self-reinforcing effect of FDI location 
in China. While most of these studies examined geographical and sectoral allocation 
of FDI, little work has been done to explore the interactions between MNE activities 
across sectors vis-à-vis local firms’ reaction. Moreover, existing studies mainly 
examine FDI sectoral activities in developed countries and relatively little work has 
been done for developing countries.
3
 
This paper attempts to fill the vacuum in the literature by examining dynamic 
activities of FDI sectoral allocation vis-à-vis local firms’ activities in China’s 
manufacturing industry. Section 2 is a brief survey of the theoretical literature on FDI 
sectoral allocation which motivates our empirical specification. In section 3 we 
present our empirical model and discuss the data and other econometric issues. 
Section 4 reports the results and compares them with the earlier findings in the 
literature. The final section concludes the paper.  
 
FIGURE 1 
Foreign Share of Owner’s Equities for 29 Manufacturing Sectors  
in China (2000-2007) 
 
                                                     
2 Caves (1974) investigates the determinants of FDI activities from 64 countries in Canada and the UK. The 
author documents that intangible assets (measured by expenditure on advertising and R&D) are significant in both 
Canada and UK, while firm size only matters in Canada. Industry concentration and entry barriers have a positive 
effect on MNE activities, whereas entrepreneurial resource is not a significant factor. Blomström and Lipsey 
(1986) study the role of firm size as a determinant of FDI and document that firm size only has a threshold effect 
on FDI; however, domestic sales, capital–labor ratio, expenditure on R&D and advertising have positive effects on 
the share of FDI sales. Santiago (1987) explores the interaction of industry- and location-specific determinants for 
FDI and reports that foreign investment at industry level is positively correlated with firm size and relative profits, 
but negatively correlated with relative fuel costs. Other studies include Saunders (1982), Ray (1989), Kogut and 
Chang (1991), Drake and Caves (1992), and Milner and Pentecost (1996). 
3 One exception is Santiago (1987) who explores the case of Puerto Rico. 
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Notes: 
(a) foreign share of owner’s equities in a sector is defined as the proportion of owner’s equities owned 
by three types of foreign-funded enterprises (namely Sino-foreign joint ventures, enterprises with 
Sino-foreign cooperation, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises). (b) data for owner’s equities are 
obtained from various issues of China Statistical Yearbook. 
 
 
2. DETERMINANTS OF FDI SECTORAL ALLOCATION 
 
For ease of reference we highlight in this section several determinants of FDI 
sectoral allocation suggested in the literature that are most relevant to our empirical 
investigation using Chinese sectoral data. The reader is referred to Faeth (2009) for a 
detailed survey of the theoretical literature and Blonigen et al. (2005) for the 
empirical literature on FDI determinants.  
The ‘ownership advantages’ hypothesis of MNE suggests that, in order to outlive 
competition in a foreign market, a firm must possess some ownership-specific assets 
such as proprietary knowledge, technology, organizational structure, management or 
marketing skills. These ownership-specific assets should at least generate profit that 
can exceed the extra costs that foreign firms may encounter in foreign markets. More 
specifically, these extra costs are due to host country uncertainties like cultural 
difference, language obstacle, and policy risk (Kindleberger 1969; Hymer 1976; 
Dunning 1980, 2001). This argument leads to the hypothesis that the existence of 
economies of scale or higher productivity compared to local firms, due to certain 
ownership advantages, is a prior condition for FDI presence. An extension of this 
argument is that, in order to obtain and maintain ownership-specific assets, MNE may 
rely on R&D activities to sustain their monopolistic power in the market; 
consequently, one should expect that the degree of FDI penetration is higher in R&D 
intensive industry. Horst (1972), Caves (1974), Swedenborg (1979), and Blomström 
and Lipsey (1986) provide empirical support for the ownership advantages 
hypothesis. Typically these studies document that factors like R&D and advertising 
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expenditure, capital intensity, labor skills, and scale economies have positive effects 
on FDI or MNE activities. 
    A notable feature of the Chinese economy is that, as a transition economy, firms 
with various ownership structures co-exist in the same industry. Huang (2003) argues 
that ‘political pecking order’ plays an important role in determining FDI pattern in 
China. The political pecking order of domestic firms in China refers to the 
phenomenon that SOEs (state-owned enterprises) are favored – over FIEs 
(foreign-invested enterprises) and other firms – in terms of market access, subsidies, 
bank credits, and general political and legal protection. The impact of political 
pecking order on FDI presence is ambiguous, however. On the one hand, unequal 
treatment discourages foreign firms from penetrating those industries in which the 
bulk of market share is under the control of SOEs. On the other hand, FDI presence 
may be higher, via joint venture or other similar channels, in industries in which SOEs 
enjoy soft budget constraint and local private firms subject to hard budget constraint. 
By forming joint venture with an SOE that enjoys soft budget constraint, the foreign 
firm may be able to access preferential treatments which would not have been 
possible otherwise. Subject to hard budget constraint, in order to obtain growth 
opportunity, local private firms may be motivated to demise their equity and seek 
joint venture with foreign firms.      
Being the most populous country in the world, China enjoys a comparative 
advantage in labor-intensive goods. Qiu (2003) proposes the ‘trade-cum-FDI’ theory 
to explain prominent FDI presence in China’s labor-intensive sectors. Assuming that 
the FDI source country has comparative advantage in capital-intensive product and 
the host country has comparative advantage in labor-intensive products, Qiu (2003) 
constructs a model to show that given sectors are different in terms of market size and 
export opportunities which are determined by comparative advantage, the host 
country’s comparative advantage sector will be more attractive to FDI than its 
comparative disadvantage sector. By investing in the host country’s comparative 
advantage industry MNEs not only avoid competition from home country’s exporters 
but also benefit from further export opportunities. The trade-cum-FDI theory 
therefore predicts that the degree of FDI presence in China should be higher in 
industries that are producing labor-intensive goods and also export-oriented.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA  
 
Conceptually the FDI theories surveyed in last section are comparative statics 
analysis of FDI incidence in which the foreign firm’s desired investment or location 
decisions are related to a number of potential determinants. An empirical panel data 
model that captures such kind of theoretical relationship is  
 
 * ' , 1,2,..., ; 1,2,..., .it it i t ity x i N t T          (1) 
 
where *ity  is desired or equilibrium FDI in sector i at time t; itx  is a vector of 
potential determinants such as ownership advantages; i  and t  are unobserved 
sector-specific and time-specific effects, respectively. In particular, t  represents 
time-varying factors that affect FDI in all 29 manufacturing sectors in China at the 
same time, for instance, international sentiment of investing in China. To capture 
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self-reinforcing or agglomeration effect of FDI activities, we postulate a partial stock 
adjustment model as in Cheng and Kwan (2000a, b):      
 
 
*
, 1 , 1( )it i t it i ty y y y     (2) 
 
where ity  is realized FDI. Combining (1) and (2), we arrive at a dynamic panel 
regression model ready for empirical implementation:  
 
 
, 1(1 ) ' , 1,2,..., ; 2,..., .it i t it i t ity y x v i N t T            (3) 
 
where , , , and .i i t t it itv           It is well known that consistent 
estimation of a dynamic panel regression requires special methods rather than the 
conventional fixed or random effects estimator (Hsiao 2003, Chapter 4). In this paper 
we rely on the system GMM approach initiated by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
fully developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) which estimates (3) as a system of 
equations in both first-differences and levels. As for linear GMM estimators, the 
Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Bond estimators have one- and two-step versions. 
Though two-step GMM is asymptotically more efficient, the conventional two-step 
standard errors tend to be severely downward biased (Arellano and Bond 1991; 
Blundell and Bond 1998). Windmeijer (2005) proposes a small-sample correction for 
the two-step standard errors which facilitate two-step robust estimations to be more 
efficient than corresponding one-step estimation, especially for system GMM. A brief 
description of the econometric procedures can be found in Appendix A. 
   We use foreign share of owner’s equities (PTOE) to measure FDI incidence in a 
sector. This is the dependent variable ity  that our empirical model (3) tries to 
explain. We include a number of explanatory variables in vector itx  as suggested by 
economic theory. Here we discuss the motivation behind the introduction of these 
explanatory variables and refer the reader to Appendix B for precise variable 
definitions. To capture the profit incentive effect on FDI we include variable TPPTA – 
profit per dollar asset in FDI firms – as a control variable in all model specifications. 
Naturally TPPTA is expected to have a positive impact on FDI incidence. The 
ownership advantages hypothesis suggests that economies of scale or higher 
productivity, due to certain ownership-specific assets, is a prior condition for FDI 
penetration. To test this hypothesis, we include variable OA – the productivity ratio of 
FDI firms to domestic firms – to capture the disparity in scale economies and 
productivities between MNCs and domestic firms. PI and PID are dummy variables 
that single out local high productivity sectors. The interaction terms, OA*PI and 
OA*PID, allow us to investigate whether the ownership advantages hypothesis holds 
in all sectors or only in high productivity sectors. These two interaction terms are of 
interest because the effect of ownership advantages may vary according to the 
characteristics of different sectors and it may be more profound when MNCs intend to 
penetrate into local high productivity sectors. The political pecking order hypothesis 
suggests that the presence of state-owned enterprise (SOE) should affect FDI 
incidence in a sector, although the direction of impact could be positive or negative. 
We construct two variables to measure the extent of SOE presence. TLOS is the 
liabilities ratio of SOE to private firms and PSIOS is the sales income share of SOE in 
a sector. If the political pecking order hypothesis holds, we would observe that both 
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TLOS and PSIOS have negative effects on FDI incidence, after controlling for other 
determinants of FDI location. The trade-cum-FDI hypothesis applied to China 
predicts that FDI would tend to invest in sectors that are labor-intensive and also 
export-oriented. To measure sectoral labor intensity we construct LBVCP, which takes 
1 if the underlying sector is labor intensive and 0 otherwise, and GREXP, which is the 
growth rate of export of a specific sector. If trade-cum-FDI hypothesis holds, we 
should observe that the interaction term between LBVCP and GREXP is significantly 
positive.  
We employ a panel dataset of 34 manufacturing sectors reported by the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China. Detailed and consistent data for foreign-funded 
enterprises are only available from 2000; consequently, we choose 2000 as the 
starting point of our sample period. Trade data are obtained from the CEINET 
database.
4
  There is a mismatch between the sectoral classification for China’s 
industry statistical report (which is named ‘GB/T 4754’) and the one for China’s trade 
statistics (which is based on international standard SITC Rev.3, and Harmonized 
System as well). By carefully comparing the definitions for these two systems, we 
combine some sectors under GB/T 4754 classification and construct a balanced panel 
dataset, which contains 29 manufacturing sectors from 2000 to 2007. The final list of 
sectors and details for the trade data construction are reported in Appendix C.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
    Empirical results for two-step system GMM estimation are reported in Table 1 
and Table 2. Following the suggestion by Roodman (2009b), we also report results 
after reducing certain instruments so as to check robustness with respect to alternative 
instrument choice.   
 
TABLE 1 
Empirical Results 
Dependent variable: ln(PTOE)                                                      Sample Period: 2000-2007 (29 Sectors) 
 IV(a)  IV(b) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.PTOE 0.519** 0.527*** 0.509** 0.489***  0.490** 0.510*** 0.514*** 0.491*** 
 (0.197) (0.163) (0.199) (0.150)  (0.213) (0.181) (0.183) (0.163) 
TPPTA 0.316* 0.408** 0.362** 0.453***  0.337* 0.423** 0.359** 0.442*** 
 (0.168) (0.169) (0.153) (0.149)  (0.184) (0.190) (0.139) (0.141) 
OA -0.280 -0.601* -0.360 -0.861***  -0.298 -0.671 -0.367 -0.853*** 
 (0.213) (0.349) (0.291) (0.256)  (0.227) (0.447) (0.218) (0.246) 
OA*PI 0.705** 0.814***    0.724** 0.855**   
 (0.276) (0.289)    (0.301) (0.336)   
OA*PID   0.891** 1.142***    0.922*** 1.147*** 
   (0.337) (0.231)    (0.290) (0.226) 
PI -0.060 0.006    -0.080 -0.072   
 (0.282) (0.217)    (0.385) (0.216)   
PID   -0.063 -0.123    0.042 -0.110 
   (0.409) (0.221)    (1.195) (0.265) 
TLOS -0.370  -0.316   -0.427  -0.298  
 (0.299)  (0.332)   (0.366)  (0.305)  
PI*TLOS -0.090     -0.037    
 (0.321)     (0.485)    
PID*TLOS   -0.441     -0.439  
   (0.417)     (0.548)  
                                                     
4 The source of data: National Statistics Online Database of P.R. China (http://219.235.129.54/cx/table/table.jsp), 
various issues of China Statistic Yearbook, and CEINET database (http:// www1.cei.gov.cn/ce/cedb/index.htm). 
The ‘valued-add for industry’ for the year 2004 is collected from various issues of sectoral reports for that year 
issued by corresponding industry associations. 
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PSIOS  -0.173  -0.161   -0.178  -0.153 
  (0.125)  (0.177)   (0.159)  (0.186) 
PI*PSIOS  -0.311**     -0.357**   
  (0.134)     (0.160)   
PID*PSIOS    -0.400***     -0.391** 
    (0.130)     (0.171) 
Hansen J Statistic 19.951 23.486 22.308 20.029  21.998 19.461 23.976 21.579 
P-value of Hansen J Statistic 0.866 0.708 0.767 0.863  0.579 0.727 0.463 0.604 
D.O.F of Hansen J Statistic 28 28 28 28  24 24 24 24 
Number of instruments 35 35 35 35  31 31 31 31 
Arellano-Bond m1 statistic -1.761 -1.742 -1.869 -1.790  -1.633 -1.731 -1.564 -1.739 
P-value of m1 test 0.078 0.082 0.062 0.074  0.103 0.083 0.118 0.082 
Arellano-Bond m2 statistic 0.247 0.357 0.278 0.721  0.267 0.464 0.215 0.693 
P-value of m2 test 0.805 0.721 0.781 0.471  0.789 0.642 0.830 0.488 
N 203 203 203 203  203 203 203 203 
Notes: 
1) IV(a): lag 2 to all deeper lag variables for lagged 1 dependent variable; lag 2 to all deeper lags for all other independent variables for 
first-differenced equations; lag 1 to all deeper lagged differenced independent variables for level equations. Dummies (PI and PID) 
and interaction terms are not included in the instrument list. 
2) IV(b): lag 2 to all deeper lag variables for lagged 1 dependent variable; lag 2 to lag 6 for all other independent variables for 
first-differenced equations; lag 1 to lag 5 differenced independent variables for level equations. Dummies (PI and PID) and interaction 
terms are not included in the instrument list. 
3) L.PTOE is 1 period lag of dependent variable. All variables are in logarithm and in first differences as well. 
4) Asymptotic standard errors, asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parentheses. *** indicates significant at the 1 
percent level, ** indicates significant at the 5 percent level, and * indicates significant at the 10 percent level. 
5) The GMM estimates reported are all two-step results. Windmeijer’s correction for the two-step standard errors is employed. 
6) Collapsed instrument matrix technique is employed to reduce the instrument count.  
7) m1, m2, and Hansen statistic reported are all two-step versions and are robust. Numbers reported in corresponding parentheses are 
degrees of freedom. 
 
    Table 1 presents empirical results for testing the ‘ownership advantages’ and 
‘political pecking order’ hypotheses. The net influence of ownership advantage (OA) 
depends on the level of labor productivity of the underlying sector. The coefficient for 
interaction terms (OA*PI and OA*PID) are highly significant and stable, which 
suggests that, ceteris paribus, given a certain level of ownership advantage, FDI firms 
tend to invest more in local high productivity sector (dummy variable PI or PID 
equals 1). The coefficient for OA is negative but not significant. A possible 
explanation for this negative coefficient is that, it may be less likely for MNEs to 
profit from or make the best use of their ownership advantages in domestic low 
productivity sectors (PI or PID equals 0). Consequently, these low productivity 
sectors are less attractive to MNEs with ownership advantages. 
    Most estimated coefficients of proxies for ‘political pecking order’ (TLOS and 
PSIOS) are negative across specifications, though not significant. When interaction 
terms are taken into account, the partial effects of these two proxies are still negative, 
which is consistent with the prediction of the political pecking order hypothesis. The 
coefficient for interaction terms associated with these two proxies, however, provide 
slightly different results. When the power of SOEs in the underlying sector is 
measured by market share (PSIOS), the coefficient for the interaction terms 
(PI*PSIOS and PID*PSIOS) is negative and highly statistically significant. When the 
political pecking order bias is measured by the soft budget constraint (TLOS) for 
SOEs, the coefficient for the interaction terms (PI*TLOS and PID*TLOS) is also 
negative but not significant. Consequently, our empirical results suggest that the 
impact of political pecking order on sectoral location of FDI may depend on the 
source of distortion and the productivity level of the underlying sector as well, which 
is no documented in Huang (2008). Estimation results presented in Table 1 show that 
the distortion is much severe in local high productivity sector in which the major 
share of the market is under the control of SOEs.   
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TABLE 2 
Estimation Results (continued) 
Dependent variable: ln(PTOE)                                          Sample Period: 2000-2007 (29 Sectors) 
 
IV(a)  IV(b) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.PTOE 0.799*** 0.701*** 0.778*** 0.669***  0.762*** 0.704*** 0.753*** 0.670*** 
 
(0.101) (0.079) (0.097) (0.066)  (0.074) (0.077) (0.096) (0.081) 
TPPTA 0.299** 0.350** 0.303* 0.330**  0.306* 0.351** 0.319* 0.343** 
 
(0.140) (0.154) (0.154) (0.120)  (0.151) (0.155) (0.163) (0.145) 
OA 0.022 -0.220 0.017 -0.313**  -0.084 -0.179 -0.033 -0.344** 
 
(0.172) (0.204) (0.233) (0.123)  (0.121) (0.207) (0.191) (0.147) 
OA*PI 0.218 0.385** 
  
 0.369*** 0.361* 
  
 
(0.197) (0.185) 
  
 (0.124) (0.190) 
  
OA*PID 
  
0.338* 0.596***  
  
0.386* 0.628*** 
   
(0.188) (0.185)  
  
(0.191) (0.211) 
PI -0.195 -0.110 
  
 -0.008 -0.038 
  
 
(0.289) (0.225) 
  
 (0.279) (0.225) 
  
PID 
  
0.239 0.043  
  
0.139 0.003 
   
(0.396) (0.123)  
  
(0.358) (0.160) 
TLOS -0.098 
 
0.003 
 
 -0.048 
 
-0.011 
 
 
(0.121) 
 
(0.207) 
 
 (0.136) 
 
(0.209) 
 
PI*TLOS -0.108 
   
 -0.215 
   
 
(0.233) 
   
 (0.322) 
   
PID*TLOS 
  
-0.589 
 
 
  
-0.582 
 
   
(0.407) 
 
 
  
(0.592) 
 
PSIOS 
 
-0.182 
 
-0.180*  
 
-0.187 
 
-0.176* 
  
(0.110) 
 
(0.102)  
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.097) 
PI*PSIOS 
 
-0.222 
  
 
 
-0.189 
  
  
(0.133) 
  
 
 
(0.171) 
  
PID*PSIOS 
   
-0.250**  
   
-0.229** 
    
(0.102)  
   
(0.101) 
LBVCP -0.273 0.004 -0.328 -0.049  -0.219 0.133 -0.384 0.002 
 
(0.597) (0.217) (0.441) (0.263)  (0.524) (0.355) (0.697) (0.291) 
GREXP 0.296 0.123 0.001 0.053  0.041 0.133 0.054 0.068 
 
(0.342) (0.266) (0.303) (0.122)  (0.317) (0.225) (0.272) (0.151) 
LBVCP*GREXP 1.276*** 1.138*** 1.553*** 1.249**  1.495*** 1.213*** 1.413** 1.256** 
 
(0.420) (0.386) (0.519) (0.472)  (0.397) (0.414) (0.522) (0.523) 
Hansen J Statistic 17.190 24.124 22.280 20.543  22.095 24.244 23.230 21.423 
P-value of Hansen J Statistic 0.985 0.840 0.900 0.941  0.733 0.617 0.673 0.766 
D.O.F of Hansen J Statistic 32 32 32 32  27 27 27 27 
Number of instruments 42 42 42 42  37 37 37 37 
Arellano-Bond m1 statistic -1.994 -2.290 -1.719 -2.312  -1.913 -2.351 -1.541 -2.394 
P-value of m1 test 0.046 0.022 0.086 0.021  0.056 0.019 0.123 0.017 
Arellano-Bond m2 statistic 0.632 0.852 0.466 0.566  0.628 0.814 0.424 0.624 
P-value of m2 test 0.527 0.394 0.641 0.572  0.530 0.416 0.671 0.532 
N 203 203 203 203  203 203 203 203 
Notes: 
1) IV(a): lag 2 to all deeper lag variables for lagged 1 dependent variable; lag 2 to all deeper lags for all other independent 
variables for first-differenced equations; lag 1 to all deeper lagged differenced independent variables for level equations. 
Dummies (PI, PID and LBVCP) and interaction terms are not included in the instrument list. 
2) IV(b): lag 2 to all deeper lag variables for lagged 1 dependent variable; lag 2 to lag 6 for all other independent variables for 
first-differenced equations; lag 1 to lag 5 differenced independent variables for level equations. Dummies (PI, PID and 
LBVCP) and interaction terms are not included in the instrument list. 
3) L.PTOE is 1 period lag of dependent variable. All variables are in logarithm and in first differences as well. 
4) Asymptotic standard errors, asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parentheses. *** indicates significant 
at the 1 percent level, ** indicates significant at the 5 percent level, and * indicates significant at the 10 percent level. 
5) The GMM estimates reported are all two-step results. Windmeijer’s correction for the two-step standard errors is employed. 
6) Collapsed instrument matrix technique is employed to reduce the instrument count.  
7) m1, m2, and Hansen statistic reported are all two-step versions and are robust. Numbers reported in corresponding parentheses 
are degrees of freedom. 
 
    Table 2 provides further estimation results for exploring the interaction between 
FDI and international trade. When additional variables are added to the regression 
equation, major conclusions drawn from Table 1 are still hold. The coefficient for 
interaction term between LBVCP and GREXP is positive and highly significant, which 
is consistent with the prediction of ‘trade-cum-FDI’ hypothesis.    
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    Estimated coefficient for the lagged dependent variable under different model 
specifications is persistently significant and positive, with a mean of about 0.62, 
indicating a fairly strong self-reinforcing effect of the past FDI on its current value. 
This result is consistent with the FDI agglomeration effect documented by Head et al. 
(1995), Cheng and Kwan (2000), and Blonigen et al. (2005). Estimated coefficient for 
TPPTA is highly significant and positive, which is consistent with economic intuition. 
We rely on Sargan/Hansen over-identification test and Arellano-Bond residual-based 
m1 and m2 statistics to test the validity of the moment conditions we adopted. The 
Sargan statistic is the minimized value of the one-step GMM criterion function which 
is not robust to heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation. Consequently, we only report 
Hansen J statistic, which is the minimized value of the two-step GMM criterion 
function and is robust to heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation. The Hansen J statistic 
reported in Table 1 and Table 2 do not reject the null hypothesis of no 
misspecification, suggesting that the moment conditions are valid. In most cases 
Arellano-Bond m1 statistics reject the null hypothesis of zero first-order 
autocorrelation and m2 statistics do not reject the null of zero second-order 
autocorrelation, which further confirm the validity of moment conditions we adopted. 
Following Andersen and Sørensen (1996), Bowsher (2002), and Roodman (2009b), 
we use both ‘collapse’ technique and also use only certain lags rather than all 
available lags for instruments to handle the instrument proliferation problem. 
Robustness checks under smaller instrument sets reported in Table 1 and Table 2 
show that our estimation results are not sensitive to the reductions in the number of 
instruments.        
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
   This paper attempts to provide some empirical evidence on the dynamic activities 
of FDI sectoral allocation vis-à-vis local firms’ activities in China’s manufacturing 
industry. Estimation results based on 29 China’s manufacturing sectors over the years 
2000-2007 indicate that, besides the profit-seeking nature of MNEs, there are several 
factors also have impact on the FDI sectoral allocation activity in China. The FDI 
sectoral allocation has a fairly strong self-reinforcing effect on itself. MNCs with 
certain ‘ownership advantages’ tend to invest more in China’s high productive sector. 
The FDI presence is discouraged in the sectors in which SOEs enjoy ‘political 
pecking order’ preferential treatment through market access. The degree of FDI 
penetration is higher in sectors that are labor-intensive and also export-oriented.   
Due to data constraints, we can only provide a primary investigation of this FDI 
sectoral allocation issue. Further work adopting firm-level data is expected to provide 
more evidence in details. Remaining questions include but are not confined to what 
are listed as follows. Is FDI sectoral self-reinforcing driven by horizontal FDI or 
vertical FDI? Will MNCs make cross-sector investments? What are the sources of 
‘ownership advantages’ for FDI in China’s manufacturing industry?  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Equation (3) is a two-factor dynamic panel data model. Following Hsiao and 
Tahmiscioglu (2008), we take care of the time specific effects t  by subtracting 
from each variable its cross-sectional mean, i.e. for variable itx  the transformation 
looks like   
 
 *
1
/
N
it it it
i
x x x N

   (A1) 
 
We then make use of the transformed variables in the rest of the analysis as if there 
were no time specific effects. To lighten notation we will omit the asterisk from now 
on and simply write itx  which is understood to have been transformed by the 
operation in (A1). Let it i itu v  . The Blundell-Bond (1998) system GMM 
approach makes use of two kinds of moment conditions (A2) and (A3):          
 
 
,
( ) 0,     1,  ... , ;  3,  ... ,  and 2.
i t s it
E y u i N t T s

     (A2) 
 
 
,
( ) 0,     1,  ... , ;  2,  ... ,  and 1.
i t s it
E y u i N t T s

      (A3) 
 
Compared with the Arellano-Bond (1991) first-differenced GMM estimator which 
makes use of (A2) alone, the Blundell-Bond system GMM approach also makes use 
of the level moment conditions (A3) which has been shown to make the GMM 
estimator much better behaved, especially when the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable is close to one and the individual fixed effects are prominent. 
Using lagged dependent variables alone as instruments as in (A2) and (A3) may lead 
to highly inefficient estimates. It is important to incorporate explanatory variables as 
additional instruments. In our application most explanatory variables like 
productivity, profit, export and import are arguably endogenous with respect to FDI 
activities. Consequently, the issue of reverse causality will have to be properly 
addressed in the econometric estimation. To deal with endogeneity we assume all 
explanatory variables to be weakly exogenous (which would allow feedback effect 
from current FDI activities to present and future FDI determinants) and the following 
moment conditions would hold:   
 
 
,
( ) 0,     1,  ... , ;  3,  ... , ;   2
i t s it
E x u i N t T s

      (A4) 
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,
( ) 0,        1,  ... , ;  3,  ... , ;  1
i t s it
E x u i N t T s

      (A5) 
 
Moment conditions (A2) – (A5) are what we assume in our application of the system 
GMM method. All computations in this paper are done by Stata package xtabond2 
described in Roodman (2009a). The details of the Blundell-Bond system GMM 
method and various implementation issues can also be found in Roodman’s paper.           
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APPENDIX B 
Variable Name Definition 
itPTOE  
The proportion of owner’s equities of FDI in total owner’s equities (TOE) of each manufacturing sector. 
FDI
it
it T
it
TOE
PTOE
TOE
  
itOA  
The ratio of value-added per labor of FDI to value-added per labor of domestic firms in the same sector. 
   
FDI FDI
it it
it T FDI T FDI
it it it it
VA AAEP
OA
VA VA AAEP AAEP

 
 
where AAEP denotes annual average employed person and VA denotes value-added. 
itPI  
A dummy indicating the productivity level of underlying sector.  
 
 
1
1
1
1
1  1
0  1
T T
it it
N T T
it itN i
it T T
it it
N T T
it itN i
VA AAEP
if
VA AAEP
PI
VA AAEP
if
VA AAEP






 





 
where AAEP denotes annual average employed person and VA denotes value-added.  
itPID  
A dummy indicating the productivity level of domestic firms in underlying sector.  
   
    
   
    
1
1
1
1
1  1
0  1
T FDI T FDI
it it it it
N T FDI T FDI
it it it itN i
it
T FDI T FDI
it it it it
N T FDI T FDI
it it it itN i
VA VA AAEP AAEP
if
VA VA AAEP AAEP
PID
VA VA AAEP AAEP
if
VA VA AAEP AAEP


  
 

 
 
 
 
  



 
where AAEP denotes annual average employed person and VA denotes value-added. 
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itTLOS  
The ratio of total liabilities (TL) per state-owned enterprises to the total liabilities per enterprise with other ownership 
structures in the same sector. 
   
S S
it it
it T S T S
it it it it
TL NOE
TLOS
TL TL NOE NOE

 
 
itPSIOS  
The proportion of sales income (SI) of state-owned firms in the total sales income of each sector. 
S
it
it T
it
SI
PSIOS
SI
  
itGREXP  The growth rate of export of each manufacturing sector. 
itLBVCP  
A dummy indicating whether the underlying sector is labor-intensive or not. LBVCP takes 1 if the labor-capital ratio of 
a specific sector divided by the mean of labor-capital ratio of the whole manufacturing industry is larger or equal to 1, 
0 otherwise. 
itTPPTA  Total profit per total asset of FDI in each manufacturing sector. 
Note:  
Superscript 'FDI' means data for MNCs, 'S' means data for state-owned firms, and 'T' means data for the whole sector. 
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APPENDIX C 
Sector Sector (GB/T 4754 System) Source of Trade Data 
1 1. Mining and Washing of Coal SITC_32 
2 2. Extraction of Petroleum and Natural Gas 
18. Processing of Petroleum, Coking, Processing of Nuclear   
Fuel 
SITC_33; SITC_34 
3 3. Mining and Processing of Ferrous Metal Ores 
25. Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals 
SITC_67 
4 4. Mining and Processing of Non-Ferrous Metal Ores 
26. Smelting and Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals 
SITC_68 
5 5. Mining and Processing of Nonmetal Ores 
24. Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral Products 
SITC_66 
6 6. Processing of Food from Agricultural Products 
7. Manufacture of Foods 
SITC_01 to SITC_09 
7 8. Manufacture of Beverages SITC_11 
8 9. Manufacture of Tobacco SITC_12 
9 10. Manufacture of Textile SITC_26; SITC_25 
10 11. Manufacture of Textile Wearing Apparel, Footwear, and 
Caps 
SITC_84; SITC_85 
11 12. Manufacture of Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products SITC_21; SITC_61 
12 13. Processing of Timber, Manufacture of Wood, Bamboo, 
Rattan, Palm, and Straw Products 
SITC_24; SITC_63 
13 14. Manufacture of Furniture SITC_82 
14 15. Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products SITC_25; SITC_64 
15 16. Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media HS_49; HS_37 
16 17. Manufacture of Articles For Culture, Education and Sport 
Activity 
HS_95 
17 19. Manufacture of Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical 
Products 
SITC_51 to SITC_53; SITC_55 to 
SITC_56; SITC_59 
18 20. Manufacture of Medicines SITC_54 
19 21. Manufacture of Chemical Fibers HS_54; HS_55 
20 22. Manufacture of Rubber SITC_62 
21 23. Manufacture of Plastics SITC_57; SITC_58 
22 27. Manufacture of Metal Products SITC_69 
23 28. Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery SITC_74 
24 29. Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery SITC_71 to SITC_73 
25 30. Manufacture of Transport Equipment SITC_78; SITC_79 
26 31. Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and Equipment SITC_77 
27 32. Manufacture of Communication Equipment, Computers 
and Other Electronic Equipment 
SITC_76 
28 33. Manufacture of Measuring Instruments and Machinery for 
Cultural Activity and Office Supplies 
SITC_75; SITC_87; SITC_88 
29 34. Production and Supply of Electric Power and Heat Power SITC_35 
Note: 
SITC stands for Standard International Trade Classification. HB stands for Harmonized System. 
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